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ELECTRICAL POWER REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS 
SINGLE FAILURE TOLERANT ENTRY 
By Marvin D. Pipher, Paul A. Green, and Debbie F. Wolfgram 
McDonnell Douglds Technical Services Co., Inc. 
'.O SUMMARY 
This document presents the results of an analysis of  the orbiter 
electrical power system for the case of a single failure tolerarlt 
[SFT) entry. 
Power System (SEPS) analysis computer program (Ref. 1). 
to permit assessment of the capability of the orbiter systems to 
support the proposed entry configuration and to provide the data 
necessary to identify potential constraints and limitations. 
The analysis was performed using the Shuttl- Electrical 
It was performed 
Three contingency modes have been identified which would require 
an SFT entry. 
the losr, of two fuel cell powerplants, while on orbit. The arlalysis 
is presented in three parts, as follows: 
This analysis addresses an SFT entry resulting from 
o Electrical Power system configurdtion definition 
o Guidelines and Assumptions for the analysis 
r) Discussion of the results of the analysis 
The results of the analysis indicate that, even under near optimum 
conditions, the fuel cell power demand will exceed the tested operating 
capacity of 16 kw, and that various electrical components may 
experience voltages below 24 VDC. Insufficient data i s  available to 
assess the implications of these limit violations, or to perform 
a worst case analysis. 
configuration cannot be shown t o  be safe for entry. 
Without this data and analysis, the SFT 
2.0 IPJTROWCTIOW 
Three f a i l u r e  mode% have been postulated that  require a minimum Orbi ter  
power entry (Ref. 2) .  The f a i l u r e  modes are the loss o f  two f u e l  
cel ls,  the loss o f  one freon loop, and the loss o f  cabin pressure. 
Lcss of  tw fue l  c e l l s  l i m i t s  the capab i l i t y  t o  provide e l e c t r i c a l  
power t o  that  avai lable Prom a s ingle fue l  ce l l .  Loss o f  a freon 
loop r e s t r i c t s  power due t o  the resu l t ing  degradation i n  heat transport 
and heat re jec t ion  capabi l i t ies .  With loss o f  cabin pressure, and 
the necessity t o  maintain an 8 ps ia environment, avai lable power i s  
l im i ted  by reduced a i r  cool ing and cryogenic oxygen f low r a t e  constraints. 
Two e l e c t r i c a l  equipment 
as possible means o f  dea 
these, known as the sing 
guidance, f 1 ight  control  
entry configurations Rave also been i d e n t i f i e d  
ing w i th  these contingencies. 
e s t r i n g  configuration, provides the minimurn 
The f i r s t  o f  
and display electronics necessary t o  accomplish 
a safe entry and landing, but provides no hardware or  software redundancy. 
This i s  the minimum power config , rat ion f o r  a safe ent ry  and landing. The 
second configuration i s  the s ingle fa i lu re  to lerant (SFT) mode. This 
configuration provides l imi ted redundancy i n  the areas o f  guidance 
and f l i g h t  control, at the expense o f  increased power and heat re jec t ion  
demands. 
Heretofore, the s ingle s t r i n g  configuration has been the design 
baseline. 
i n  the c r i t i c a l  f l i g h t  control  areas, however, the SFT configuration 
i s  being considered as a revised baseline. 
performed t o  evaluate the capabi l i ty  o f  the e lec t r i ca l  power 
generation system t o  support t h i s  configuration and t o  i d e n t i f y  
DiJe t o  concerns regarding the lack o f  f a i l u r e  tolerance 
This analysis was 
2 
possible bus voltage limitations and constraints. 
The analysis was performed with the XPS computer program, using the 
basic avionics configuration of Reference 2, with equipment usage 
variations derived through a series o f  meetings with flight control 
division personnel. 
3 
3.0 SYSTM DEFINITIOW DATA 
The EPS, as inodeled by the SEPS computer program, consists of the 
orbiter electrical power generation and distribution subsystems. The 
system generates required orbiter electrical power and delivers it to 
end item loads in accordance with a predefined equipment time line. 
The sections which follow define the EPS system characteristics and 
the system loads used in this analysis. 
3.1 Fuel Cell Characteristics 
The fuel cell performance characteristics, used in the analysis, 
are those illustrated in Figure 3.1-1. These characteristics were 
derived from powerplant performance predictions and test data, 
and include extrapolations beyond the operational capabilities 
of the powerplant. The portion of the curve lying between 2 and 
72 kilowatts (kw) is based on predicted initial powerplant performance, 
as defined in the Shuttle Operational Data Book (Ref. 3). The 
portion of the curve ranging from 12 to 16 kw is predicated on 
the wsiJ:ts of powerplant tests performed i n  Pupport of SFT entry 
analyses. The portion of the curve above 16 kw is an extrapolation 
for purposes of analysis and may not be representative of actual power- 
pl ant performance. 
3.2 Circuit Description 
The SEPS circuit, used in the analysis, i s  described in Reference 4. 
This description i s  in conformance with Shuttle Operational Data Book 
(SODS) amendments 59 and P2-144 (Refs. 3 and 5). The guidellnes and 
assumptions used In formulating the circuit are discussed, in detail, 
in Reference 6. 
4 
3.3 Inverter Characteristics 
The inverter performance characteristics used I n  the analysis 
are shown i n  Figure 3.3-1. 
3.4 Orbiter Electr ical  Loads 
The orbi ter  e lec t r i ca l  equipment l i s t ,  u t i l i z e d  i n  the performance 
o f  t h i s  analysis, i s  that defined i n  Reference 7 for operational 
orbiters. This l i s t  corresponds t o  the OV-103 equipment l i s t  
contained i n  SOD6 Amendment f’ (Ref. 3). 
3.5 Payload Electr ical  Loads 
No discrete payload e lec t r i ca l  equipment was u t i l i z e d  i n  the performance 
of t h i s  analysis. The maximum power al location f o r  maintaining 
a safe payload, however, was applied as a constant power load 
on aux i l ia ry  bus A, a t  stat ion 693 (Ref. 8). 
5 
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4.0 WIDELIIS A#) ASSU#gTIO#S 
The guidelines fallwed d the assunptims ma&, i n  the fmwlation 
of the WS enalysis,,are the subject of this section. 
4.1 6uidelincs -- 
The guidelines used in  fowulating the single failure tolerant 
entry analysis m e  as follows: 
a. The vehicle malsed is an OV-103 configuration orbiter on 
an operational fli@t. 
b. The single failure tolerant entry resulted fm the loss of 
f w l  c@lls 2 itnd 3. 
c. The electrical pmer distribution subsystem i s  reconfigured 
such that fuel cells 2 and 3 are isolated, while fuel cell 
1 i s  supplying power to main buses A, B, and C. 
d. The analysis i s  initiate0 with fuel cells 2 and 3 Cactivabed 
and fuel cell 1 supplying all power. 
e. The analysis covers the interval fm three hours prior to 
deorbit until the orbiter i s  Cactiwated 4.56 k r s  later. 
f. Critical avionics equipment i s  ccnfigud in accordance with 
Reference 2, including those changes identified therein as 
being requested by the WAS. The awionics canfigarration used 
is that presented in Table 4.1-1. 
8 
The fol lowing assumptions were made i n  formulating tk single 
f a i l u r e  t o l e r m t  entry analysis: 
a. Two hundred watts of payload safing pmw are applied as a 
constant pasrer load on auxi l iary  bus A. 
b. No obss k i t  i s  instal led. 
c. Thermal conditioning of the orb i ter  i s  impractical due t o  
thermal lag and the t ia te  available. Therefore, a mmrinal 
a t t i tude and a $0 to  50 degree beta angle w e r e  used t o  define 
thermal control heater operation. 
d. With fuel c e l l  p,werplants 2 and 3 off ,  their produet water 
l i n e  heaters are assumed to cycle wi th  4W duty cycles. 
e. WO nose gear s t r u t  actuator heater i s  instal led. 
f. A11 conmunication requirements are sa t is f ied  using S - k n d  
direct. Therefore, no Ku-Band equipment i s  required. 
9. The fol lowing heaters were disabled i n  accordance wi th  information 
obtained from f l i g h t  control d iv is ion personnel: 
(1) Forward RCS thruster heaters 
(2) Forward RCS l i n e  and tank heaters 
(3) A f t  RCS vernier thruster heaters 
(4) FES port feedwater l i n e  heaters 
(5) Waste H$l dump l i n e  heaters 
9 
Matte H$ dump nozzle heaters 
Potable H@ ckrrag l i n e  h a t e r s  
Potable H@ dueip nozzle heaters 
02/H2 purge l i n e  heaters 
R#S a m  heaters 
SsbdE c o n t ~ ~ l l e r  heaters 
Ku-band deployed assembly heaters 
Ku-band cable heaters 
PLB and RplS fv camera heaters 
PLB and RMS pan ti lt assembly heaters 
6al ley Hfl heaters 
02 cryogenic heaters (one set) 
A i r  data probe heaters 
h. F l igh t  deck l i gh t i ng  was configured i n  accordance with in fomat ion 
received fm C. D. WheelwigRt/EU5. The configuration used 
was as follows: 
(1) Forward instrument l i gh ts  - 40% o f  max p m r  
(2) Glareshield f loodl ights  - 20% o f  max poker 
(3)  Forward numerics - 50% o f  rnax power 
i. One hydraulic c i rcu la t ion pump was operated from the s ta r t  
of the analysis u n t i l  the beginning o f  the pre-&orbit aerosurface 
deflect ion checks at  deorbit minus 2:30:00. 
operated from deorbit minus 1:30:00 u n t i l  the GPC's were configured 
fo r  descent a t  deorbft minus 00:35:00. 
It was subsequently 
j. TRe brake skid power units tiere 8ctiwetd f iw minutes prior 
to  touchdown. 
TPUKE 4.1-1 
AVIOWICS COWIWWATIOW FOR ST EW7WY 
DESCaI PTIOW 
CENTRAL PROCESSIN6 UWITS-IWPUT/OUfPUT PROCESSORS 
WLTIPLEXER/DEPILILTIPLEXERS - ff 
WLTIPLEXER/DMULTIPLEXERS - FA 
MJLTIPLEXER/DB4JLTIPLEXER - PI. 
DISLAY WCIVEU UNITS 
MASS #woBY UHITS 
PCU M T E R  U N - 3  
#ULTIPL€XER/G- IULTIPLEXER - OF 
WLTIPLEXER/DEWLTIPLEXER - OA 
HULTIBLEXER/DEHULTIPLEXER - FLIGHT DECK 
DISPLAY n ~ c m I e s  UAIITS/CRT DISBUY uwm 
M A I N T E W E  LOOP RECORDER 
U I D E W  S I G N  COPJDIVIOWERS 
SIGWAL COWOITIOWIffi UWITS 
IWERTIAh Wt!A!%RmEtdT UWIfS 
AIR DATA TRBwsIwcER BSSEWBLIES 
RATE 6YcITRo ASSEMBLIES 
ACCELEROMETERS 
RUDDER PEDAL TRANSDUCER SSEMBLIS 
SPED BRME THRUST C r n L L % R S  
AEROSURFACE SERVO AD9PLIFIERS 
R W T I O W  COWTROL SYSTEM RJD'S 
S-BAWD Ft4 'IRAWSBIITT'ER 
S-BAWD M E R  M P L I F I E R  
S-BAMD RE-AMPLIFIER 
S - W D  TRMSPOWDW 
S-$APT NETWORK S I G N  PROCESSOR 
T M  i 
ROTATIONAL HAW) comoLLms 
MICROWAVE SCAN BEMI LANDIWG SYSTEM 
RADAR ALTIMETERS 
AUDIO TERMINAL UWITS 
HORIZONTAL SITUATION INDICATORS 
ALrHA MACH INDICATORS 
ALTITUDE VERTICAL VELOCITY INDICATORS 
FUEL CELL PC;IERPLANTS 
APU/h"QAOLICS SYSTEMS 
OF1 S\,lEM 
E,' 3s 
AlTITUDE DIRECTOR INDICATORS - FORWARD 
WHBEFt K T I #  
2 
3 
3 
1 
2 
3 
0 
1 
3 
3 
1 
0 
0 
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2 
3 
3 
3 
1 
1 
1 
3 
4 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
3 
N/A 
rmw 
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5.0 SIWGLE FAILURE TOLEaablT ENTRY W N Y S I S  
This E 6  analysis was prfomned using the 
prog-am (Ref. l), agerating with ingut data k i w d  from the $OURCE 
data base. The SEPS gmgram -1s the orbiter electrical ptmw 
g@n@ration end distribution subsysttms and, working to a gmlefiml 
electrical equipment tiate line, gemrates circuit analysis data 
bas& on a nodal solution technique. The !3OlRCE data base i s  
a magnetic tape file containing a corngosite of all orbiter electrical 
equipment, along witn activity blocks defining the nominal usage 
of that equipment. The data base provides the capability to select 
the equipment complement o f  any desired orbiter along with the 
nominal usage of that equipment as a function of specific flight 
parameters. 
modify the nominal usage data, contained within the SOURCE data 
base, i n  accordance with the requirements of this specffic contingency 
situat ion. 
analysis computer 
In performing this analysis, it was necessary to 
5.1 Analysis Definition Data 
The following definition data was used as input to this analysis: 
a. SOURCE Data Base Input Data. 
(1) Orbiter - OW-103 (Operational) 
(2)  Crew Si telshif t  Description - 4/Single Sift 
(3) Payload Support Equipment - N/A 
(4) OMS Kits/RH Manipulator - N/A 
(5 )  Payload Effects on Orbiter - None 
13 
b. Deviations from nominal SOURCE data base equipment usage 
were made as required t o  conform t o  the guidelines and assump- 
t ions o f  Section 4. 
c. The t ime  l ine used i n  t h i s  analysis of the SFT ent ry  contingency 
i s  presented i n  Table 5.1-1. 
5.2 Analysis Results 
The resul ts  of the single fa i lu re  tolerant entry analysis are 
as follows: 
a. Figure 5.2-1 presents fue l  c e l l  1 power, current, and voltage 
f o r  the SFT entry contingency, as analyzed. A review o f  t h i s  ' 
f igure indicates that  fue l  c e l l  power can be expected t o  range 
from 11.92 kw t o  16.90 kw, with-an average value o f  14.06 kw. 
Furthermore, the peak power point can be expected t o  occur 
a f te r  stoprol l ,  when the three hydraulic c i rcu la t ion  pumps 
are activated. 
was 16.14 kn. This l e v e l  was achieved 1.33 hours p r i o r  t o  
deorbit, while the payload bay doors were closing. 
The maximum power observed p r io r  t o  touchdown 
b. A fur ther  review o f  Figure 5.2-1 reveals that  the fue l  c e l l  1 
voltage can be expected t o  range between 27.40 and 28.55 VK, 
with the minimum occutring a f t e r  s topro l l ,  when the three hydraulic 
c i rcu la t ion  pumps are activated. 
p r i o r  t o  touchdown was the 27.58 VDC value which corresponds 
t o  the pre-touchdown peak power point. 
The minimum voltage experienced 
14 
c. Figures 5.2-2 through 5.2-5 present voltage profiles for the 
forward, mid, aft, and essential buses, as analyzed. Figure 
5.2-6 is a corresponding plot of the voltage levels experienced 
at circuit breaker panels 14, 15, and 16. For purposes of 
analysis, constraint limits were set on each o f  these parameters 
and the parameters w e  monitored for limit violations. The 
limits used, the lemst values experienced, and the numbers 
of constraint violations are tabulated in Table 5.2-1. 
should k observed that, for tR@ a#Kt part, the limits used 
represent the expected worst case voltage levels at the local 
buses. These are the levels which were used in selection 
of the wire sizes necessary to insure component interface 
voltages &we 24 Mlc, under worst case conditions. The single 
exception was the essential bus voltage limits, which were 
set to 27.0 WE. 
It 
d. Tapes created in the performame o f  this analysis are itemized 
in Table 5.2-11. 
5.3 Analysis Uncertainties 
The following major analysis uncertainties should be considered 
when interpreting the results of this analysis: 
a. The fuel cell curve utilized in this analysis is representative 
of a relatively new powerplant. Predictions are that an older 
powerplant will produce a somewhat lower voltage for any given 
power lewel. A review of existing data (Ref. 3) indicates 
15 
that t h i s  decrease w i l l  be on the order o f  0.65 VM: a t  12 kw 
and that  it m a y  be greater a t  higher power lev@ls. A supple- 
mentary analysis has been performed using powerplant charaeteris- 
t i c s  thought t o  be more representative o f  a 5000 hour fue l  
c e l l  but, since no supporting fue l  c e l l  t es t  data is  available, 
the results must be considered as tentative, a t  best. The 
results, however, are presented i n  Table 5.3-1 f o r  information. 
b. Them1 control syst@nl (TCS) heaters were not cycled i n  t h i s  
analysis, but atere averaged over time. The peak power effects 
of mul t ip le  heaters being on concurrently, therefore, w i l l  
not be apparent f r o m  t h i s  analysis. As a result, actual maximum 
power levels may be s ign i f i can t ly  higher than those indicated 
i n  Figure 5.2-1. 
heater power application, see Reference 9. 
For a discussion o f  the effects o f  :oncurrent 
e. The heater usage factors used i n  t h i s  analysis were those 
of a nominal a t t i tude wi th in  the beta angle rang@ o f  40 t o  
50 degrees. The effects o f  t h i s  contingency occurring a t  a 
worst case at t i tude and beta angle were not considered. 
d. I n  general, the SEPS computer program does not model wir lng 
to  discrete e l t x t r i c a l  end-items below the ?oca1 bus level. 
To acquire data below the local bus level, the component 
interface voltages must, therefore, be calculated from analysis 
local bus voltages, using actual wire lengths and sizes, 
and the corresponding load power values. 
e. Fuel c e l l  parerplant operating characteristics above 16 kw 
16 
are indeterminate. The operating characteristics usd above 
this 9ewl are based on extrapolations from test data and 
may not be representative of actual fuel cell operation. 
f .  The TCS heater usage factors usd in this analysis are based 
on preliminary and partially complete thermal analysis data. 
g. Iuo KS heaters wre active in this analysis when below 400,OOo 
f@@t . 
17 
6.0 CONCLUSIONS 
The following conclusions may be drawn from this analysis: 
a. Both fuel cell power and bus low voltage limits will be violated 
during an SFT entry, even under near optimum conditions. 
b. lnsufficient data i s  available to allow a worst case analysis 
or t o  permit an assessment of the impact of limit violations. 
The analysis indicates, however, that, during an SFT entry under 
nomipal ta cold thermal conditions, a catastrophic fuel cell 
failure may occur along with random component failures. 
the available information indicates that the magnituo. of these 
failures will be a function nf the specific thermal conditions 
and the accumulated operating time on the one remaining fuel 
cell. 
In addition, 
c. To perform a more definitive analysis, the following actions 
are required: 
1. The characteristics of a near SOU0 hour fuel cell must be 
determined from 12 KW to the maximum operating limit (fuel 
c ~ l l  failure). 
?. Oetailed heater duty cycles must be determined for the worst 
case attitude and beta angle. 
3. Critical items of electrical e?itipment must be identified 
and their low voltage operating limits must be determined. 
4. Line resistances must be determined between a l l  ?oca1 buses 
and the end i tem equipment. 
d. Without a worst case analysis based on the above data, the SFT 
configuration cannot be shorn to  be a safe mode of entry. 
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TABLE 5.1-1 
SFT ENTRY ANALYSIS - TIME L I N E  
TIME 
( HHMMSS ) 
000000 
003000 
003500 
01 3630 
025000 
025015 
030000 
030641 
033828 
034328 
041935 
042035 
0 4 2  1 35 
343335 L 
EVENT 
BEG I N  ANALY S I S  
FCS CHECKOUT 
CLOSE PLB DOORS 
RCS MANEUVER 
DEORBIT 
APU SYSTEM ON 
400,000 FEET 
(TCS HEATERS OFF)’ 
TOUCHDOWN 
STOPROLL 
APU SYSTEM OFF 
EOM 
ACTIVITY BCp 
NAME 
ORBIT COMMON (ORB-DEORB) 
RCS ATTITUDE CONTROL 
OEORBIT PREP 1 
PLB DOORS OPEN 
SFT CRYO HEATERS 
APU DESCENT 
APU DESCENT 
PLB DOORS OPEN 
PLB DOORS CLOSE 
FWD RCS MANEUVER 
FWD RCS MANEUVER 
NOMINAL HTRS BETAz40-50 
MISS ION COMMON (GSE-GSE) 
ORBIT COMMON (ORB-DEORB) 
DESCENT COMMON (DEORB-GSE 
DESCENT COMMON (DEORB-SR) 
OMS MANEUVER 
RCS ATTITUDE CONTROL 
DECRBIT PREP 1 
PLB DOORS CLOSE 
OMS MANEUVER 
APU DESCENT 
DESCENT (DEORB-400 KFT) 
DESCENT (DEORB-400 KFT) 
DESCENT (400 KFT-SR) 
NOMINAL HEATERS BETA-540-5 
DESCENT (DEORB-SR) 
DESCENT (400 KFT-SR) 
POSTLANDING (SR-GSE) 
MISSION COMMON (GSE-GSE) 
DESCENT COMMON (DEORB-GSE 
DESCENT (LOW ALT OPS) 
APU DESCENT 
SFT CRYO HEATERS 
- 
ON 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
x 
- 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
x 
X 
X 
X 
X 
- 
OFF -
X 
r 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X -. 
For purposes of analysis 
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TaQE W E  -- 
DATA 
IWTWACE 1 
INTERFACE 2 
PLOTS 
TABLE 5.2-11 
E 6  ANALYSIS TAPE 1WOBbBB;TIBRI 
X 1 5227 
X15144 
X15175 
X15202 
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